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Abercrombie 2.0—Can We Get There from Here? 
Thoughts on “Suggestive Fair Use” 
JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER* 
In response to Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and 
Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2015). 
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There must be some description in almost any suggestion or the 
suggesting process will not take place. So what we have in any 
trade-mark case is a matter of judgment as to what side of the 
line the question mark falls upon. 
– Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Linford, unlike Caesar’s Antony, seeks not only to bury 
Abercrombie,2 but to praise it,3 at least in part. Using linguistic evidence, both 
historical and experimental, he would relocate a bobbled boundary—from the 
descriptive–suggestive transition to the suggestive–arbitrary transition—and 
thereby establish a reformed template for sorting word marks according to their 
source-signifying strength. The basic difference between acquired and inherent 
distinctiveness not only remains in Linford’s account, however; it draws new 
strength from insights about semantic change. Behold, Abercrombie 2.0! His 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
 1 Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1953) (emphasis 
added) (concluding, at 146–47, that “Q-Tips” is a protectable mark for cotton-tipped swabs 
because “[t]he first [syllable], ‘Q,’ [is] purely arbitrary and fanciful; the second [is] closer to 
being descriptive but [is] still used, even in ordinary parlance, in an unusual way”); see also 
United Lace & Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthels Mfg. Co., 221 F. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1915) 
(“Every good trade-mark is suggestive; once seen or heard, its association with the product 
is readily fixed in the mind. If there were no association of ideas between the two, it would 
require an independent effort of memory to recall the connection.”). 
 2 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(setting forth a hierarchy of distinctiveness for words claimed as trademarks eligible for 
protection against another’s confusingly similar use as a source signifier). 
 3 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (S. P. Cerasano ed., W. W. 
Norton & Co. 2012) (1623) (“Antony: Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears. I 
come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.”).  
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recent article, which is both provocative and engaging, continues the 
reconstructive work Linford began in his critique of the conventional view that 
a generic word can never serve as a trademark, even if a substantial share of 
consumers have come to perceive it as a source signifier.4 
Unlike Caesar, the Abercrombie hierarchy of distinctiveness for 
trademarks—approaching its fortieth birthday with citations in more than 850 
cases and more than 580 law review pieces, now the dominant framework for 
classifying the conceptual strength of word marks5—looks more than stout 
enough to weather a pitched knife fight without a scratch.6 Indeed, Linford 
prudently “acknowledge[s] the difficulty of implementing the [Abercrombie-
reforming] proposals outlined” in his new article.7 He describes various 
strategies, both legislative and judicial, for moving suggestive marks out of the 
“inherently distinctive” category to achieve Abercrombie 2.0.8 Though I am not 
a professional linguist, and thus cannot judge the completeness of his discussion 
from that perspective, I find Linford’s account of the linguistic evidence, and its 
normative consequences for trademark law, cogent. At the very least, it “calls 
into question the current protection of a suggestive mark on its first use in 
commerce.”9 His account prompts me to further explore matters of doctrinal 
shift, the form of change more familiar to those with legal training. 
As I explain below, I am skeptical that trademark law will recategorize 
suggestive marks to require proof of acquired distinctiveness as a condition of 
protection, in the manner we now treat descriptive marks. In short, to quote 
another son of Maine, “you can’t get there from here.”10 Perhaps, however, we 
can reach a nearby doctrinal destination, involving not the way one proves that 
a suggestive mark is distinctive (i.e., a source signifier in a given context), but 
the way one proves that the accused use of a word is illicitly confusing. In other 
words, we reconsider not the right’s validity, but its scope.11 Yet, like the 
                                                                                                                     
 4 See generally Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” 
Trademarks, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 110 (2015). 
 5 See Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of 
Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1040 (2009) (“The foundation of the 
modern treatment of word marks is the now-settled classification system set forth in 
Abercrombie . . . [which] has become the dominant framework for evaluating the 
protectability of word marks.”). 
 6 In fairness to Caesar, he never stood a chance, encircled as he was by the ring of 
dagger-thrusting assassins who had carefully plotted their attack. See BARRY STRAUSS, THE 
DEATH OF CAESAR 133–35 (2015) (describing the attack). 
 7 Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive 
Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1420 (2015) [hereinafter Linford, False Dichotomy]. 
 8 Id. at 1415–20. 
 9 Id. at 1420. 
 10 ROBERT BRYAN & MARSHALL DODGE, Which Way to Millinocket?, on BERT & I … 
AND OTHER STORIES FROM DOWN EAST (Bert & I, Inc. 1958), 
https://youtu.be/p6V2Ew1M0sE [https://perma.cc/328P-HZJE]. 
 11 This has become a standard move in intellectual property analysis, moving among 
(or trading off between) the three major groups of policy levers we have: validity, scope, and 
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distinctiveness-focused change Professor Linford urges, the doctrinal change I 
explore takes as proved that “[a] suggestive mark is less likely to be perceived 
as a source signifier from the consumer’s first exposure, because the metaphoric 
connection between mark and product has a stronger effect than the law 
currently recognizes.”12 One could capture the change I consider with the phrase 
suggestive fair use. 
II. LINFORD’S CRITIQUE OF SUGGESTIVE-MARK STRENGTH 
As Professor Linford recounts, suggestive marks emerged from the 
conceptual space between descriptive and arbitrary marks: “Courts were split 
on what to do with terms that were not clearly arbitrary nor exactly 
descriptive.”13 The uncertainty was consequential, given that, under the federal 
trademark regime of the time, arbitrary and fanciful marks could be registered 
and sued upon, and descriptive terms were left to a different body of law, unfair 
competition, with a different conceptual structure.14 “When faced with marks 
that were on the borderline between the descriptive and arbitrary categories, the 
courts strained to uphold registrability by using the term ‘suggestive.’”15 In 
effect, they developed the category to avoid forfeitures in cases where plaintiffs 
seemed to have fairness on their side, in part, one imagines, based on the lack 
of a procompetitive explanation for the accused’s choice of words for its own 
goods or services.16 
                                                                                                                     
remedies. The locus classicus is Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent 
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). 
 12 Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7, at 1413; see also id. at 1409 (“[T]rademark 
law mistakenly exaggerates the difference between suggestive and descriptive marks. 
Semantic shift research indicates that a metaphoric polyseme like a suggestive trademark 
enhances the connection between mark and product through processing advantages similar 
to those provided by a metonymic polyseme like a descriptive mark.”). 
 13 Id. at 1408. 
 14 See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 11:63 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining “[w]hy the ‘suggestive’ category arose”). 
For a description of the conventional contrast from that era, see Milton Handler & Charles 
Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 
168, 168–70 (1930). 
 15 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:63. Judge Friendly described this history in 
Abercrombie itself, observing that “[t]he category of ‘suggestive’ marks was spawned by the 
felt need to accord protection to marks that were neither exactly descriptive on the one hand 
nor truly fanciful on the other—a need that was particularly acute because of the bar in the 
Trademark Act of 1905 . . . on the registration of merely descriptive marks regardless of 
proof of secondary meaning.” Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 
10 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 16 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 601 
(1988) (“Simple boundaries and simple remedies, it turns out, may yield radically 
unexpected results, and may destroy the confidence we need for trade, rather than fostering 
it. It is forfeiture, the prospect of dramatic or disproportionate loss, that brings this home; 
and forfeiture—and the detailed ways in which it might have been avoided—can only be 
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Suggestive words, straddling descriptive and arbitrary words as they do, 
occupy an inherently unstable space in trademark. One way to depict the 
instability, inspired by Linford’s analysis,17 is to modify Table 2 in the Linford 
piece18 to juxtapose the strength of the initial semantic connection between word 
and good on one axis, and the language depletion risk on the other. In this two-
by-two arrangement, shown below, it is plain both that arbitrary and fanciful 
words belong in the upper left-hand box, and that descriptive and generic words 
belong in the lower right-hand box. Suggestive words, by contrast, are hard to 
place: they have a stronger semantic relationship to the target good than do 
arbitrary or fanciful words, which points to the upper right box; but, by virtue 
of that very fact, they also have a larger language depletion risk than do arbitrary 
or fanciful words, which points to the lower left box. (One can generate the 
instability from the other end just as readily: when compared to descriptive or 
generic words, suggestive words have both a weaker semantic relationship to 
the target good (pointing to the lower left-hand box) and, by virtue of that very 
fact, a smaller language depletion risk (pointing to the upper right-hand box).) 
Neither choice captures the full story, and thus neither is entirely satisfying. 
Table 1: Where Do Suggestive Words Belong? 
Language 
Depletion Risk 
Initial Semantic Relationship to Target Good 
Weaker Stronger 
Smaller 
Arbitrary Words 
Fanciful Words 
Suggestive Words? 
Larger Suggestive Words? 
Descriptive Words 
Generic Words 
 
                                                                                                                     
known to us ex post.”); see also id. at 597 (“A strong element of moral judgment runs through 
the cases in which mud supersedes crystal. These cases are often rife with human failings—
sloth and forgetfulness on the one hand, greed and self-dealing on the other. These vices put 
pressure on our efforts to elaborate clear and distinct property specifications, and make 
judges and others second guess the deals that call for a pound of flesh.”). An illustrative case 
is N. K. Fairbank Co. v. Central Lard Co., 64 F. 133 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894), in which the 
court held that the defendant’s use of “Cottoleo” infringed the plaintiff’s mark “Cottolene,” 
used for a lard substitute comprising cotton-seed oil and beef fat. Given the defendant’s sharp 
practice, the court protected the mark notwithstanding its somewhat descriptive character: 
“It seems clear that ‘Cottolene’ is a proper and valid trade-mark. Although it may suggest 
cotton-seed oil, it is not sufficiently descriptive to render it invalid as a trade-mark under the 
recent decisions. The rule that names suggestive of the nature or composition of articles may 
be valid trade-marks if not too accurately descriptive of their character or quality has been 
applied in [several cases].” Id. at 134 (emphasis added). 
 17 See Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7, at 1414 (observing that “the 
effectiveness of the metaphoric connection between suggestive mark and product may mean 
that suggestive marks benefit from some of the anti-competitive advantages that caution 
against automatic protection of descriptive trademarks”). 
 18 See id. at 1383. 
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Professor Linford’s critique of the current Abercrombie framework, which 
he firmly grounds in his elaboration of linguistics evidence about semantic 
change, or “shift,” is, in a sense, an argument about the importance of putting 
suggestive words in the right-hand column, alongside descriptive and generic 
words. The legal change he urges would conform suggestive marks to 
descriptive marks, treating both as requiring proof of acquired distinctiveness 
before trademark protection attaches. (My alternative, by focusing on scope 
rather than validity, is, in a sense, an argument about the importance of putting 
suggestive words in the bottom row. In both accounts, however, trademark 
would treat suggestive more like descriptive marks.) 
The key moves, at the core of his account, are these: to create a mark is to 
change semantic meaning, either by adding a new source-signifying meaning to 
an existing word or by coining an entirely new word to signify source. Evidence 
of etymological change and cognitive reception of new word meanings is 
therefore relevant to understanding trademark creation.19 When we consider that 
evidence, we learn that, in contrast to fanciful marks (monosemy) and arbitrary 
marks (homonymy), both suggestive marks (metaphoric polysemy) and 
descriptive marks (metonymic polysemy) take cognitive advantage of existing 
meaning by embracing and extending it.20 In short, “a suggestive mark, like a 
descriptive mark, trades on the relationship between existing product-related 
and new source-signifying meanings.”21 Trademark law fails to recognize that 
consumers adapt to suggestive marks in a manner highly analogous to the way 
they adapt to descriptive marks, and thus it improperly groups suggestive marks 
with arbitrary and fanciful marks as inherently distinctive source signifiers upon 
first use.22 “Suggestive marks are not as naturally distinctive as the law 
presumes. . . . Thus, a suggestive mark should not be treated as inherently 
distinctive.”23 
How, then, does this correction to doctrine come about? Linford suggests a 
number of strategies, all of which focus directly on recategorizing suggestive 
words to alter the showing needed to earn valid trademark rights in them. First, 
he concludes that “[r]edrawing the suggestive–descriptive line would require a 
                                                                                                                     
 19 Id. at 1393. 
 20 Id. at 1394–1401. 
 21 Id. at 1401.  
 22 Id. at 1402–03, 1412–14; see, e.g., id. at 1414 (“The diachronic and cognitive 
research indicates that the suggestive mark is connected to the product offered through 
mechanisms that enhance product salience more than source significance. The law may thus 
err in presuming that a suggestive mark is inherently distinctive. If the economic search cost 
account favors marks that are inherently distinctive with relatively automatic protection, the 
law should not extend that favor to suggestive marks.”). 
 23 Id. at 1415; see also id. at 1421 (“The semantic shift literature provides evidence that 
arbitrary marks likely stand out as source-signifying from their first use in commerce. But 
the same is not true for suggestive marks. Suggestive and descriptive marks are not identical, 
but their similarities outweigh their differences, and those differences do not justify treating 
suggestive terms as inherently distinctive.”). 
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statutory change,”24 because the Lanham Act currently offers registered status 
to, inter alia, any word that is not “merely descriptive.”25 As he explains, even 
if we agree that the law should not treat suggestive words as inherently 
distinctive, “courts and trademark examiners would balk at defining [a 
suggestive word] as ‘merely descriptive.’”26 Even though Abercrombie’s 
hierarchy of distinctiveness is judge-made law, and thus judges could—purely 
as a matter of power, not prudence—unmake it as well,27 I agree with Linford 
that, at a stroke, to move suggestive words entirely out of the group of inherently 
distinctive terms, and into the group requiring proof of acquired distinctiveness, 
is a job for Congress. He also suggests alternative, less dramatic legislative 
changes, such as “set[ting] a lower bar for suggestive marks to acquire 
distinctiveness than [for] descriptive marks” to do so28; or combining the 
distinctiveness recategorization with an offsetting change to the infringement 
inquiry, such that “the lack of direct connection between mark and product 
could serve as a thumb on the scale in favor of commercial strength grounded 
in conceptual strength.”29 
These legislative changes to the Lanham Act are plainly possible, as a 
formal matter, especially if they were to be applied purely prospectively 
(removing even the possibility of a takings claim).30 But are they likely? The 
answer turns not only on whether there is a strong, proper evidentiary basis to 
embody the policy change in an amendment to the statute. Let us assume that 
exists here. There is also the question of political economy. Can we envision a 
coalition of interests that would coalesce to bring about the legislative change(s) 
Linford describes, as well as an absence of sufficiently robust opposition to 
prevent the change(s)? I am no more a professional political scientist than I am 
a professional linguist. I cannot help but speculate, though, that the repeat 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Id. at 1416. 
 25 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2012) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant 
may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal 
register on account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of a mark which . . . when used on or 
in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively 
misdescriptive of them . . . .”). One can sue for infringement of a registered mark. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1114(1). Moreover, if one sues to enforce an unregistered mark, see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a), its distinctiveness—its validity as a mark—is judged by the same standards 
applied to registrability. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210–13 
(2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767–69 (1992). 
 26 Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7, at 1416.  
 27 On the broader question of the nature and scope of the judicial role in trademark law, 
Professor Michael Grynberg’s work is indispensable. See generally Michael Grynberg, The 
Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1283 (2011); Michael Grynberg, Things 
Are Worse than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a ‘Formalist’ Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 897 (2009). 
 28 Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7, at 1417. 
 29 Id. at 1417 (emphasis added). 
 30 See Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 183–84 
(discussing the Takings Clause question that may pertain to retroactive changes to 
intellectual-property interests). 
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players who now make such effective use of the trademark system as registrants 
and litigants—to say nothing of the many lawyers who represent them before 
the Trademark Office and the courts—would not sit idly by as a legislator 
intentionally and explicitly sought to make a commercially vital category of 
word marks31 harder, more costly, to validly obtain. Professor Linford, as is the 
norm for law professors (including me), does not pair his normative 
recommendation for legislative change to an interest-group or other political-
economy account for actually bringing about that legislative change. This is not 
something law professors typically do (to the frustration of some, I am sure); 
and thus I emphasize that I do not mean, in pointing it out, to criticize his piece. 
In any event, I cannot provide a scenario for actually enacting the legislative 
change for which Linford’s work would provide the evidentiary and normative 
foundations.32 
What about the courts? There, again, I think Linford has it right. Even if we 
put aside the obstacle the text of the Lanham Act puts in the way of simple 
judicial abrogation of the Abercrombie hierarchy, decades of judicial practice 
treating suggestive marks as inherently distinctive create a habit that may be 
hard to resist. Linford opines—quite reasonably, I think—that it is “possible that 
courts would resist even a modest change to the status quo vis-a-vis suggestive 
marks,” even in the event that “Congress embraced one of the statutory revisions 
outlined” in his article.33 Without that legislative push, it is that much more 
challenging for parties to overcome the force of judicial habit when determining 
the distinctiveness of suggestive marks under Abercrombie: “The law has 
treated suggestive marks as inherently distinctive for so long that the contours 
of a direct inquiry into [a mark’s validity] might continue to follow that 
predisposition.”34 
                                                                                                                     
 31 See Continental Scale Corp. v. Weight Watchers Int’l, 517 F.2d 1378, 1380 
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (“[A]s we have often pointed out and as is very well understood, suggestive 
words may be and frequently are very good trademarks.”); Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. 
Alexander B. Stewart Orgs., 50 F.2d 976, 979 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“It is well settled in 
adjudicated cases that a valid trade-mark may be highly suggestive (in our opinion oftimes 
the best ones are), without being offensively descriptive.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 14, 
§ 11:65 (“If a quantitative survey of all marks were taken, it would probably show that a 
substantial part, if not a majority, of all marks are suggestive of the product to some 
extent . . . .”). 
 32 My failure of imagination is equally applicable to national law and state law. Though 
trademark laws, including statutorily created registration systems, function in the states, see 
generally Mark P. McKenna, Teaching Trademark Theory Through the Lens of 
Distinctiveness, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 843, 844–46 (2008) (comparing the federal and state 
trademark systems), the same political-economy gap would confront a state system that was 
otherwise willing to engage in a bit of Brandeisian “laboratory of democracy” policy 
variation. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting from the invalidation of an Oklahoma state ice-sales licensing statute). 
 33 Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7, at 1419.  
 34 Id. 
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Are we fated, then, to fail to adapt the law to the facts about suggestive 
words and semantic change that Professor Linford has ably marshalled? Perhaps 
we are, if we limit ourselves to adaptations that directly tackle the validity aspect 
of suggestive marks. But there is no reason to limit ourselves to that aspect, 
given that we can cash out the greater-than-recognized similarity to descriptive 
marks by focusing instead on doctrines of scope. 
Step back and reconsider the competitive context within which we ask these 
questions about firms’ varied uses of words (and other materials) to 
communicate with consumers. Giving one firm exclusive use of a term as a 
mark, merely on the basis of the firm’s first use of it that way in commerce and 
without evidence that consumers actually perceive it as a source signifier, does 
not cause any competitive concern unless other firms use, or will surely want to 
use, that term to communicate about their own offerings but not using it as a 
source signifier.35 But the linguistic evidence Professor Linford reviews gives 
us a strong basis—if any more were needed—to expect that sellers may well use 
suggestive language, as well as descriptive language, to highlight to customers 
salient aspects of their goods and services. There is thus a competitive concern 
to address.36 
In the context of descriptive marks, we address that competitive concern in 
two ways. On the validity side, one cannot claim the descriptive term as a mark 
without proof of acquired distinctiveness among consumers,37 whether direct 
(i.e., survey evidence) or circumstantial (i.e., duration and volume of sales, 
advertising expenditures, and the like).38 It is on the validity question that 
Professor Linford focuses. On the scope side, which we can also consider, a 
descriptive mark cannot be used to prevent another party from using the same 
term in its descriptive sense, and not as a source signifier.39 This is known both 
as “classic fair use” and “descriptive fair use.”40 The Lanham Act codifies the 
defense for registered marks,41 and courts have long applied it more generally 
                                                                                                                     
 35 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 175, 187–97 (2003) (discussing the 
consequences for competition of protecting different word types as trademarks). 
 36 Cf. Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S-O-S Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Posner, J.) (“To allow a firm to use as a trademark a generic word, or a descriptive word 
still understood by the consuming public to describe, would make it difficult for competitors 
to market their own brands of the same product.”). 
 37 See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:15.  
 38 See id. § 15:30. 
 39 See id. §§ 11:15, :45. 
 40 Id. § 11:45. 
 41 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (providing that “the right to use the registered 
mark . . . shall be subject to the following defenses or defects: . . . [t]hat the use of 
the . . . term . . . charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a 
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the 
goods or services of such party”). 
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in federal actions to enforce unregistered marks and to common law claims.42 A 
frequently cited authority for the descriptive-fair-use principle is William R. 
Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,43 from the pre-Erie era. In Warner, the 
Supreme Court rejected the contention that plaintiff Lilly could use the mark 
“Coco-Quinine,” which the Court viewed as descriptive, to prevent competitor 
Warner’s use of the (equally descriptive) name “Quin-Coco.”44 As the Court put 
it, “[t]he use of a similar name by another to truthfully describe his own product 
does not constitute a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the 
public to mistake the origin or ownership of the product.”45 
Now reflect on the full range of application for this scope-limiting principle. 
As Abercrombie put it, “[w]hen a plaintiff has chosen a mark with some 
descriptive qualities, he cannot altogether exclude some kinds of competing 
uses.”46 Suggestive words, too, have descriptive qualities. That is the linguistic 
evidence on which Linford’s critique turns: “a metaphoric polyseme like a 
suggestive trademark enhances the connection between mark and product 
through processing advantages similar to those provided by a metonymic 
polyseme like a descriptive mark.”47 In other words, “[l]ike a descriptive mark, 
a suggestive mark is derived from a feature of the product sold.”48 We should 
thus expect to see cases in which a defendant argues that its use of another’s 
suggestive mark is a descriptive fair use, as well as cases where a descriptive 
fair use is, frankly, of a more suggestive variety. Linford’s work provides a new, 
cogent basis for crediting those arguments, as well as for judges’ embracing 
them. And embrace them judges have. 
III. SUGGESTIVE FAIR USE 
To successfully make out the affirmative defense of classic fair use, an 
accused infringer must prove “(1) the use of the mark is not a trademark use; (2) 
                                                                                                                     
 42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1995); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:49. 
 43 William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924). 
 44 Id. at 528. 
 45 Id.; see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (“When the mark is 
used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to 
prevent its being used to tell the truth. It is not taboo.”); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 311, 327 (1871) (“True it may be that the use by a second producer, in describing 
truthfully his product, of a name or a combination of words already in use by another, may 
have the effect of causing the public to mistake as to the origin or ownership of the product, 
but if it is just as true in its application to his goods as it is to those of another who first 
applied it, and who therefore claims an exclusive right to use it, there is no legal or moral 
wrong done. Purchasers may be mistaken, but they are not deceived by false representations, 
and equity will not enjoin against telling the truth.”). 
 46 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(emphasis added). 
 47 Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7, at 1409. 
 48 Id. at 1413. 
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the use is fair and in good faith; and (3) the use is only descriptive.”49 Court 
have upheld the defense in contexts where the plaintiff’s mark is suggestive 
(thereby limiting the scope of such marks), and where the defendant’s use is 
arguably more suggestive than descriptive (thereby recognizing the way in 
which suggestion is semantically akin to description). Linford’s work 
indicates—to me at any rate—that these decisions accord with the linguistic 
evidence about semantic change and the cognitive similarity between 
metaphoric and metonymic extension, and thus between suggestive and 
descriptive reference. Indeed, in light of Linford’s account, parties could 
strengthen these green shoots in the trademark jurisprudence with more overt 
reliance on linguistics evidence. 
Consider, first, the question whether a defendant can argue classic fair use 
in a case where the plaintiff’s mark is other than descriptive. The codified 
defense, as to federally registered marks, does not specify anything about the 
asserted mark’s grade of distinctiveness. Rather, it centers on the nature of the 
defendant’s use, requiring that it be (1) “otherwise than as a mark,” (2) “fair[] 
and in good faith,” and (3) “to describe the [accused’s] goods or services.”50 
From the perspective of both competitive concern and semantic operation, 
suggestive marks—like descriptive marks—should be limited by classic fair 
use. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held to the contrary in 1991, 
concluding that categorizing a plaintiff’s mark as descriptive “was necessary 
before deciding whether defendants could avail themselves of the fair use 
defense.”51 Other Courts of Appeals, however, have upheld the classic fair use 
defense against suggestive and other nondescriptive marks. For example, in 
upholding the denial of an injunction to the candy maker asserting the mark 
“Swee TARTS” against Ocean Spray’s use of the phrase “sweet-tart” to describe 
its sweetened cranberry drinks, the Seventh Circuit observed that “[u]nder the 
Lanham Act it is irrelevant whether the Swee TARTS mark is itself descriptive, 
and the district court did not need to pursue the question.”52 Similarly, in 
                                                                                                                     
 49 Webceleb, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 554 Fed. Appx. 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2014). 
For an engaging analysis of the descriptive fair use defense, contextualized in a broader 
account of trademark fair use, see William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 49, 82–88 (2008). 
 50 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). 
 51 Inst. for Sci. Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 
1010 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 52 Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1995). 
In a more recent Seventh Circuit case, Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Operating Co., 
509 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2007), the court did not analyze the question in terms of descriptive 
fair use, but it easily could have done so. The plaintiff used “Top” as a mark for tobacco with 
a picture of a toy spinning top—in other words, as an arbitrary mark. Id. at 381. The 
defendant used “Top” as part of the phrase “Fresh-Top Canister”—in other words, as a 
description of its packaging. Id. at 381–82. Dispensing with the traditional multi-factor 
analysis of the central question in trademark infringement, likelihood of consumer confusion 
as to source vel non, the court of appeals simply held that consumer confusion was inherently 
incredible on the facts presented: “What Top Tobacco wants us to do is to ignore the pictures 
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overturning a district court’s rejection of the fair use defense, the Second Circuit 
concluded that “it should make no difference whether the plaintiff’s mark is to 
be classed on the descriptive tier of the trademark ladder.”53 The Second, 
Seventh, and Ninth54 Circuits have the better side of this split than the Third 
Circuit, based on Linford’s evidence and analysis. Happily, the statute permits 
what linguistics commends. 
Consider, second, the more challenging question whether a defendant can 
argue classic fair use in a case where that use is not tightly descriptive, but rather 
trades on a looser semantic connection to the defendant’s offering. In other 
words, posit a use that, were the defendant claiming the term as a source-
signifier, it might with considerable merit argue that the use was suggestive (and 
thus inherently distinctive) because it takes some imaginative thinking to 
connect to the good or service.55 Again, the codified defense requires, in 
relevant part, that the purportedly fair use “describe the [accused’s] goods or 
services,”56 but the statute does not prescribe, further, how tight or loose that 
description must be to qualify. The linguistic evidence that Professor Linford 
has canvassed should help us appreciate that there will be a host of difficult-to-
categorize uses. The difficulty of sorting descriptive from suggestive marks at 
the validity stage, which Linford also reviews,57 should do the same. Perhaps it 
is no surprise, then, that, as with the prior question, the Courts of Appeals have 
reached somewhat different answers. 
The Second Circuit has, in a series of cases, accepted looser, more figurative 
descriptions as fair uses. In Car-Freshner v. S.C. Johnson, the owner of the pine-
                                                                                                                     
and the lack of any reason to believe that anyone ever has been befuddled. Like other courts, 
this circuit has articulated a multi-factor approach to assessing the probability of 
confusion. . . . But it’s unnecessary to belabor the point. A list of factors designed as proxies 
for the likelihood of confusion can’t supersede the statutory inquiry. If we know for sure that 
consumers are not confused about a product’s origin, there is no need to consult even a single 
proxy.” Id. at 383. The court could have reached the same holding—i.e., no liability—by 
treating the defendant’s label information as descriptive fair use.  
 53 Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995); 
see also id. (“Regardless whether the protected mark is descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or 
fanciful as used in connection with the product or service covered by the mark, the public’s 
right to use descriptive words or images in good faith in their ordinary descriptive sense must 
prevail over the exclusivity claims of the trademark owner.”). 
 54 See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 
1025, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that “how [plaintiff] Fortune’s DELICIOUS mark is 
categorized as a matter of conceptual strength has no bearing on whether Victoria’s Secret 
is entitled to the fair use defense”). 
 55 See MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:67 (“The most popular test with the courts is 
the ‘imagination’ test. The more imagination that is required on the customer’s part to get 
some direct description of the product from the term, the more likely the term is suggestive, 
not descriptive. Thus, while a descriptive term directly and clearly conveys information 
about the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the product or service, the ‘suggestive’ 
term only indirectly suggests these things.”). 
 56 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). 
 57 See Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7, at 1370, 1386. 
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tree shape as a mark for cardboard air fresheners for cars alleged that S.C. 
Johnson infringed its mark by using a pine-tree shaped plastic housing for its 
Christmas season “Plug-Ins” air freshener with pine scent.58 The Court of 
Appeals overturned the district court’s rejection of Johnson’s descriptive fair 
use defense. Along the way, the court held that the pine-tree shape described not 
only the scent of the product (which seems quite direct), but because “a 
Christmas tree is traditionally a pine tree, the use of the pine-tree shape refers to 
the Christmas season, during which Johnson sells this item.”59 That strikes me 
as a looser connection. Two years later, in a case about a promotional campaign 
for lipstick using the phrase “Seal it with a Kiss!!”—which the court deemed to 
be a descriptive fair use, rather than an infringement of the mark “SEALED 
WITH A KISS” for lip gloss—the Second Circuit discussed descriptive use and 
Car-Freshner this way: 
Though the terms of the Act recognize the fair use defense where 
the name or term is used “to describe the goods,” that phrase has not 
been narrowly confined to words that describe a characteristic of the 
goods, such as size or quality. Instead, we have recognized that the 
phrase permits use of words or images that are used, in Judge Leval’s 
helpful expression [in Car-Freshner], in their “descriptive sense.” In 
Car-Freshner, though the image of a pine-tree shape communicated an 
aspect of the product, its pine scent, use of the image was also approved 
because the image referred to the Christmas season in which the product 
was sold. This description (by the suggestive use of the image) of the 
period in which the product was sold was deemed to be a “description 
of the goods” within the meaning of the fair use defense.60 
Look at that phrase again: description “by the suggestive use of the image.” 
Description by suggestion is still description, the court concludes. And, 
semantically, so it is. The promotional phrase “Seal it With a Kiss!!” was loosely 
descriptive too: “Though the words . . . do not describe a characteristic of the 
defendants’ product, they surely are used in their ‘descriptive sense’—to 
describe an action that the sellers hope consumers will take, using their 
product.”61 In the Second Circuit, at least, a “[d]efendant’s fair use . . . can fit 
within the statutory defense if its use is descriptive in a broader sense.”62 The 
linguistics evidence supports this view. 
                                                                                                                     
 58 Car-Freshner Corp.,70 F.3d at 268. 
 59 Id. at 270. 
 60 Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 
(2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 
 61 Id.  
 62 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:49; see also Bell v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 
539 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1258 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“Although Bell protests that such a use does 
not describe a specific characteristic of Harley’s products or goods, courts do not interpret 
the Lanham Act’s fair use language so narrowly. To the contrary, courts have applied the 
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The Ninth Circuit, more recently, suggested a decidedly narrower view of 
descriptiveness in the fair use defense. In Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s 
Secret Stores Brand Management, the plaintiff asserted its mark for footwear, 
“Delicious,” against Victoria’s Secret’s use of the same word printed on 
promotional tank-top shirts used in a campaign to launch a new cosmetics line.63 
The appellate court’s central focus in the case is the improvidence of the district 
court’s summary judgment ruling; it concluded that several genuine issues of 
material fact, both about the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark and the nature 
of the defendant’s use, required trial. In analyzing the question of descriptive 
fair use, however, the Ninth Circuit made clear that it takes a narrower view 
than the Second Circuit’s on what counts as descriptive use. First, pointing to a 
supporting passage in the Restatement of Unfair Competition,64 the court 
concluded that “the scope of the fair use defense varies with what we will call 
the descriptive purity of the defendant’s use and whether there are other words 
available to do the describing.”65 The inverse relationship the court posits 
between “descriptive purity” and fairness of the use is quite unlike the Second 
Circuit’s embrace of description by suggestion. Then, by way of framing the 
fact question on the fairness of use that remained for the jury on remand, the 
court emphasized that “as a defendant’s use of a term becomes less and less 
purely descriptive, its chances of prevailing on the fair use defense become less 
and less likely.”66 Again, this close calibration of descriptiveness to fairness is 
hard to square with express acceptance of description by suggestion. And 
though it hews closer to traditional doctrine, by equating description for 
distinctiveness with description for fairness, the Ninth Circuit’s approach draws 
little, if any, support from Professor Linford’s linguistics evidence and analysis. 
In short, trademark law in the regional circuits already embodies—albeit 
within two circuit splits—constraints on the scope of suggestive marks of just 
                                                                                                                     
fair use doctrine in situations where the defendant’s use of the trademarked phrase described 
a feeling inherently associated with the phrase or typically experienced by the consumer 
upon using defendant’s product. Applied to these facts, Harley-Davidson descriptively used 
‘Ride Hard’ to capture the consumer’s intended reaction of vigor and energy to Harley-
Davidson products and merchandise.” (citations omitted)). 
 63 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 
1029 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 64 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1995) (“The scope of use permitted under the fair use defense should reflect the degree to 
which the descriptive meaning of the term is relevant to the goods, services, or business of 
the subsequent user. If the original meaning of the term is not in fact descriptive of the 
attributes of the user’s goods, services, or business, the defense is not applicable. If the term 
is only marginally descriptive or descriptive of only a relatively unimportant characteristic, 
the scope of fair use will be narrower than for terms that directly describe aspects or features 
of the goods or services that are of importance to prospective purchasers. Similarly, the 
absence of alternative terms capable of adequately describing the pertinent characteristic is 
also relevant in assessing the commercial justification for the use and hence the scope of 
permissible fair use.”). 
 65 Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1041 (emphasis added). 
 66 Id. at 1042. 
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the sort that Linford’s work could be taken to recommend. Moreover, if parties 
continue to urge courts to take a capacious view of what counts as descriptive 
use in the classic fair use context, and if court embrace that view, the cases may 
develop to the point where Congress could clarify and cement that view by 
codifying a new, suggestive variety of classic fair use. True to form, law 
professor that I am, I do not have a political-economy account of the legislative 
event. I simply note that, much as the current Lanham Act codifies a common-
law descriptive fair use defense, Congress could amend the Lanham Act to 
embrace a suggestive fair use defense in parallel terms. It could, for example, 
shield from liability a use, otherwise than as a mark, of a term that is suggestive 
of, and used fairly and in good faith only to suggest, a commercially salient 
quality of the goods or services of the accused.67 
To do so would, to be sure, leave intact the Abercrombie hierarchy of 
distinctiveness that Professor Linford has cogently critiqued. But perhaps a 
robust suggestive fair use defense can blunt the force of misclassifying 
suggestive marks as inherently distinctive on first use. And especially in its 
judicial variant, which needs little more than continued development under 
pressure from parties who show with care the descriptive sense in an otherwise 
suggestive phrase, it is easier to see how to get there from here. 
                                                                                                                     
 67 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). 
